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AbsTrACT
The past few decades have seen growing interest in the 
neuropsychiatric syndrome of apathy, conceptualised 
as a loss of motivation manifesting as a reduction of 
goal-directed behaviour. Apathy occurs frequently, and 
with substantial impact on quality of life, in a broad 
range of neurological and psychiatric conditions. Apathy 
is also consistently associated with neuroimaging 
changes in specific medial frontal cortex and subcortical 
structures, suggesting that disruption of a common 
systems-level mechanism may underlie its development, 
irrespective of the condition that causes it. in parallel 
with this growing recognition of the clinical importance 
of apathy, significant advances have been made in 
understanding normal motivated behaviour in humans 
and animals. These developments have occurred at 
several different conceptual levels, from work linking 
neural structures and neuromodulatory systems to 
specific aspects of motivated behaviour, to higher order 
computational models that aim to unite these findings 
within frameworks for normal goal-directed behaviour. 
in this review we develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding pathological apathy based on this current 
understanding of normal motivated behaviour. we first 
introduce prominent theories of motivated behaviour—
which often involves sequences of actions towards a 
goal that needs to be maintained across time. Next, 
we outline the behavioural effects of disrupting these 
processes in animal models, highlighting the specific 
effects of these manipulations on different components 
of motivated behaviour. Finally, we relate these findings 
to clinical apathy, demonstrating the homologies 
between this basic neuroscience work and emerging 
behavioural and physiological evidence from patient 
studies of this syndrome.
InTroduCTIon
The importance of outcomes for motivating 
behaviour has long been recognised. Philosopher 
and physician John Locke ascribed a crucial role 
for reinforcers (pleasure and pain) for motivating 
actions, writing that without these perceptions
… we should have no reason to prefer one thought 
or action to another … and so we should neither 
stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our 
thoughts (if I may so call it) run adrift … In which 
state man … would be a very idle, inactive creature, 
and pass his time only in a lazy lethargic dream. (s1)
This description resonates with much of the 
phenotype of apathy, a neuropsychiatric syndrome 
conceptualised as a loss of motivation that mani-
fests in reduced goal-directed behaviour1 2—see 
box 1 for key definitions. Other terms often used 
to describe this syndrome include abulia, akinetic 
mutism, athymhormia and autoactivation deficit 
(see online supplementary table 1 for proposed 
diagnostic criteria). Apathetic patients often report 
that they “can’t be bothered,” that activities “don’t 
seem worth it,” or that they “just don’t know” why 
they no longer engage in behaviours they used to do 
(box 2). However a mechanistic understanding of 
this syndrome remains elusive.
Although prevalence estimates vary widely 
depending on assessment tools and the clinical 
population studied, there is no doubt that apathy 
is a common accompaniment to a broad range of 
brain disorders (table 1). A number of neurodegen-
erative, vascular, inflammatory, infectious and trau-
matic brain pathologies have been associated with 
the development of apathy, while it is also a compo-
nent of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia 
and anhedonia associated with major depressive 
disorder. It can be the first clinical marker of a 
developing condition, as in Parkinson’s disease 
(PD), and in some conditions (eg, Huntington’s 
disease) apathy has been shown to closely track 
disease progression (s2). Importantly, its presence 
is associated with worsened quality of life for both 
patients and their families/caregivers, highlighting 
the clinical significance of this syndrome.3 4 Indeed, 
the presence of apathy may negate the otherwise 
positive effects of interventions targeting other 
aspects of disease, such as deep brain stimulation 
for the motor symptoms of PD.5
Since the work of both Marin1 and Levy and 
Dubois,2 apathy has generally been considered 
as divisible into three core components, each of 
which could contribute to (or be the manifestation 
of) reduced goal-directed behaviour/motivation. 
These are an affective/emotional component, a 
behavioural activation component and a cogni-
tive component. Furthermore, Levy and Dubois2 
proposed that these components may relate to 
disruption of distinct frontal cortex-basal ganglia 
circuits. Many questionnaires used to assess apathy 
include subscales that purport to map onto these 
separate components.6 This approach has undoubt-
edly been important in advancing understanding 
of the apathetic syndrome. However it remains 
unclear how these components map onto under-
lying normal neurobiological systems, the disrup-
tion of which are the presumed underlying drivers 
of apathy in the first place.7 Furthermore these 
components have not been extensively studied in 
humans or animal models. Therefore in this review 
we prefer to develop a framework for apathy based 
on current understanding of the processes under-
lying normal motivated behaviour—processes we 
review in more detail below.
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box 1 Key terms and abbreviations
 ► Apathy: a syndrome of impaired motivation and consequent 
reduced goal-directed behaviour.
 ► Motivation: a construct that encompasses the reasons and 
processes underlying behaviour directed towards or away 
from environmental stimuli.
 ► Goal-directed behaviour: actions towards an outcome, in 
which the current outcome value for the organisms, as well 
as the costs associated with the action, are accounted for.
 ► Habitual behaviour: actions that occur in response to a 
particular stimulus, without explicit reference to the outcome 
or costs of the action. Such ‘stimulus-response’ systems are 
shaped by learning systems which compute whether an 
action results in a better or worse than predicted outcome, 
making the same action more or less likely to be repeated on 
subsequent exposure to the stimulus.
 ► Reward: this term has a clear meaning when used as a noun 
(ie, food reward) or a verb referring to actions (to reward 
someone). However, when used as a neurobehavioural 
process, this term has no standard usage and can be quite 
ambiguous. In some contexts, it is used as a synonym for 
pleasure. In others, it is used as a synonym for reinforcement. 
Thus, overuse of the term reward can be confusing. In this 
paper, when used, reward refers to a reinforcer.
 ► Reinforcer: the positive (reward) or negative (punishment) 
outcome of an action that informs goal-directed behaviour 
and also shapes subsequent habitual behaviours.
 ► Effort: physical or mental work or activity done to achieve a 
particular end or goal; vigorous exertion of power.
 ► Instrumental: the phase of motivated behaviour during 
which an organism is approaching a motivational stimulus 
or behaving so as to deliver that stimulus or increase its 
probability of occurrence; also referred to as appetitive, or 
‘seeking’ behaviour.
 ► Consummatory: the phase of motivated behaviour during 
which an organism directly interacts with the motivational 
stimulus (eg, intake of food or water); also referred to as 
‘taking’.
 ► Effort-based decision making (EBDM): this can refer to 
specific behavioural tasks in which an organism must choose 
between a preferred reinforcer that requires high exertion 
of effort and a less preferred reinforcer requiring no or little 
effort (also termed effort-based choice). EBDM also refers to 
a more generalised framework centred around exertion of 
effort for reinforcers, including effort-based choice, vigour and 
persistence towards goals and learning about the outcomes 
of actions.
 ► Vigour: the intensity or local rate of an instrumental 
behaviour.
 ► Persistence: the maintenance of behaviour over time. 
Motivated behaviour is often characterised as being vigorous 
and persistent.
 ► Prediction error: the discrepancy between the outcome value 
and the earlier prediction of what this value would be. Strong 
evidence supports the view this is encoded by fast (phasic) 
changes in dopamine levels and drives learning processes to 
influence future behaviour.
box 2 Transcript of an interview with a patient with 
significant apathy in the context of cerebral small vessel 
disease
Doctor: “If I was a fly on the wall watching you at home, what 
would I see you doing?”
Patient: “I suppose sitting, watching television which drives him 
mad, … (pauses) …, I did use to book-read but I don’t seem 
to be doing that much these days. Um, and that’s basically it, 
really.”
Doctor: “So watching the television?” (Patient nods). “Anything 
else?”
Patient: “I can’t think of anything, really.”
Doctor: “In the past, would that have been you?”
Patient: “No”.
Doctor: “What would we have seen if we had been a fly on the 
wall a few years back?”
Patient: “Me buzzing around, doing things, going out shopping, 
coming back, you know, being busy all the time. And I’ve just 
slowed down and more or less come to a halt. I just don’t know 
what is stopping me really.”
Doctor: “You said you used to enjoy reading. So what’s stopping 
you reading?”
Patient: “Absolutely nothing. It’s just that I can’t be bothered I 
suppose. It’s easier to watch a screen than read a book. I keep 
threatening to pick up a book but I just don’t get there.”
Doctor: “What else did you use to do in the past? You said you 
used to run the house?”
Patient: “I used to sew. I used to sew all my daughter’s clothing. 
Knit. But, it seems to all have gone … I don’t do any of that now 
and I don’t know why.”
Doctor: “Would you like to?”
Patient: (pauses) … “Umm. Part of me wants to say yes, and part 
of me says I can’t be bothered.”
Doctor: “How would you describe your mood?”
Patient: “Well I think that my mood is good and always is.”
Doctor: “What about things that give you pleasure? Are there 
things that make you laugh?”
Patient: (laughing) “Annoying him!” (husband); “sorry” (still 
laughing).
Doctor: (laughing) “Apart from that? Are there any other things 
that give you pleasure, that you like doing?”
Patient: “My daughter often takes me out to the cinema which I 
enjoy very much. Umm, I really don’t do much else.”
Studies examining the neuroimaging correlates of the apathetic 
syndrome have identified consistent associations between apathy 
and disruption of specific medial frontal cortex and subcortical 
structures—see refs7 8 for reviews. These include anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventral 
striatum (VS). Strikingly, these changes are present across a 
disparate range of underlying pathologies and identifiable using 
multiple imaging techniques. This suggests a crucial role for 
these structures in the development of apathy, and the possibility 
that it is the disruption of specific brain systems and cognitive 
processes—rather than any specific molecular pathology causing 
this disruption—that matters most in its aetiology.
In parallel with the growing recognition of the clinical 
importance of apathy, significant advances have been made in 
our understanding of normal motivated behaviour in humans 
and animals. These advances have occurred at several concep-
tual levels, from research that links particular neural structures 
and neuromodulatory systems to specific aspects of motivated 
behaviour,9–12 through to higher order computational models 
of neural function that aim to unite these findings within 
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Table 1 Apathy occurs commonly in a broad range of neurological and psychiatric conditions
Condition Prevalence Comments
Parkinson’s disease (PD) 17%–70% (likely 
~30% in the general 
population)
A common non-motor symptom of PD. Occurs at all stages of the disease and is a presenting symptom in >20% 
of patients. Clear evidence it is an intrinsic (rather than reactive) feature of PD.3 50
Alzheimer’s disease ~50% Along with PD, apathy in AD probably has had the greatest level of research interest to date, including 
epidemiology, imaging correlates and therapeutics (s16).
Sporadic cerebral small vessel 
disease (SVD)
15%–30% An increasingly recognised complication of SVD, with a clear association between apathy and both background 
vascular risk factors and imaging changes of SVD (s17, s18).
CADASIL 40% One of the cardinal features of this condition. Occurs at all clinical stages but more likely with progression of the 
disease (s19).
Stroke (large vessel territory) ~30% Occurrence is associated with worse outcomes and poorer quality of life4 (s20).
Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) >50% (particularly 
behavioural variant)
A core feature of behavioural variant FTD (which can have different underlying pathologies), although also 
present in other subtypes. Strongly associated with impulsivity (s21).
Progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) Up to 90% Occurs in nearly all patients with PSP (s22).
Corticobasal syndrome 50%–90% A common feature of this neurodegenerative syndrome, which is associated with different underlying 
pathologies (s23).
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 40% A common feature, with at least mild apathy symptoms present in most patients (s24).
Huntington’s disease >30% Common and strongly related to disease progression (s2).
Traumatic brain injury 20%–72% Increasingly recognised as a sequalae (s25).
HIV infection 25%–40% A common sequelae of HIV infection, it has been related to the extent of brain pathology particularly within the 
ventral striatum and the subcortical white matter (s26, s27).
Multiple sclerosis (MS) 22% Emerging evidence suggests apathy is a common neurobehavioural feature of MS (s28).
Myotonic dystrophy 40% A noted feature of this condition, although limited research to date (s29).
Wilson’s disease 24% Reported in some patients in a single study (s30).
Depression 38% Dissociable from, but associated with the syndrome of depression, particularly anhedonic components (s31).
Schizophrenia 47% One of the core components of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (s32).
References are provided in the online supplementary material.
CADASIL, Cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical Iinfarcts and leukcoencephalopathy.
frameworks that explain the production of normal goal-di-
rected behaviour.13 With these advances comes an opportunity 
to understand complex neuropsychiatric syndromes, such as 
apathy, in terms of dysfunction of normal underlying cognitive 
processes.
The neurosCIenCe of moTIvATed behAvIour
Motivated behaviour in humans and other animals is character-
ised by active efforts to obtain positive reinforcers (rewards). 
This truism suggests three fundamental processes at work. First, 
an internal valuation system must determine the subjective value 
of ongoing events in terms of their hedonic or aversive poten-
tial, as well as their potential costs, including energy expenditure 
(effort) and temporal proximity (figure 1A). Second, a motor 
system must act on the environment in order to pursue outcomes 
with high value and to avoid aversive events (figure 1C). And 
third, a mediating system, under the influence of the value 
system, must activate the motor system towards particular goals 
(figure 1B).
The value system includes the VS (comprising the nucleus 
accumbens (NAc) and adjacent areas in the rostral caudate 
nucleus and the ventral-rostral putamen) and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which includes the most rostral 
areas of ACC and adjacent areas of medial OFC14 (figure 1A). 
Although VS and vmPFC are reciprocally interconnected, they 
may differ in the information they encode. There is evidence 
that the VS mediates a process of learning, via conditioning, 
which states of the environment predict future rewards.15 For 
example, a cigarette smoker might learn by such a process that 
the sight of a package of cigarettes predicts the reward value 
of a forthcoming smoke. Because these associations are devel-
oped through a gradual process of reinforcement, they can be 
difficult to dispel. By contrast, the hallmark of vmPFC function 
is its flexibility: although activity within vmPFC is also sensitive 
to the subjective value of events,16 there is evidence that this 
activity varies dynamically as if such values are being reassessed 
on the fly.14 Neural activity in vmPFC also parametrically varies 
with the subjective value of multiple different reward types, 
which allows for comparison across qualitatively different types 
of outcomes and reinforcers on a common scale.17 This flexi-
bility appears to support rapid shifts in preference, for example, 
as when a dieter favours high-protein foods one day and liquid 
foods the next.
Once computed, this value information must be translated 
into appropriate behavioural responses (figure 1B). The neural 
circuitry underlying this mediating system is complex and 
distributed. Although some theories have proposed a hard 
distinction between valuation and motor systems,15 it is widely 
accepted in behavioural neuroscience that both VS and ACC 
serve as crucial ‘limbic/motor’ interfaces, under the influence 
of the mesolimbic dopamine (DA) system, which originates in 
the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain and projects widely 
to these regions and related structures18 (figure 1D). More-
over, although DA is a key modulator, other neurotransmitter 
systems may also play a crucial role.19 20
The DA system carries at least two reward-related signals 
(but see Berke21). Fast or phasic (100–200 ms) increases and 
decreases in DA neuron firing-rate convey the so-called reward 
prediction error signals that indicate when ongoing events 
are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than expected. These signals enable 
the neural targets of the DA system to learn what actions 
and events elicit positive reinforcers, which can in turn guide 
future behaviour.22 Additionally, slower or tonic DA signals are 
thought to regulate levels of physical and cognitive activation, 
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figure 1 Conceptual framework and brain basis of motivated behaviour. The translation of value (reinforcer) information into a behavioural response 
can be conceptualised as three distinct processes. (A) A valuation system computes the subjective value (ie, allowing for current internal states and costs 
to obtain the reinforcer) of the current and potential events. (B) A mediating system integrates this reinforcer/cost information to activate the motor system 
towards particular goals. (C) A motor system produces behaviour towards motivationally relevant stimuli. Furthermore, these processes occur along two 
distinct neurocognitive dimensions (right side of panel). (1—vertical axis) Behaviour can be activated by flexible, but computationally demanding, goal-
directed systems, which actively represent the outcome of potential actions along with the costs of these actions. it can also be activated by inflexible, 
simpler habitual systems, which activate responses based on previously learnt stimulus-response mappings. (2—horizontal axis) Motor control functions 
are hierarchically organised, such that complex behaviours are represented as higher level, abstract actions (eg, fly to London) as well as the lower level 
subcomponent behaviours (eg, book a flight, move mouse cursor upwards…). Outcome feedback and learning occur at all hierarchical levels to inform 
future behaviour. Such hierarchical arrangements likely occur within both goal-directed (predominantly cortical) and habitual (predominantly subcortical) 
systems. (D) These processes are instantiated within a complex network of reciprocally connected cortical and subcortical brain regions, under the influence 
of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. A single brain region likely contributes to more than one process, but with specialisation. Hence the value system 
predominantly involves the vmPFC and , the motor system predominantly pMCC, SMA, ACC and the dorsal striatum (including the caudate and the 
putamen), while the vS, ACC and mesolimbic dopamine (originating in vTA) form the mediating system. This gradient of function is represented in the figure 
by the gradual change from gold (reinforcer) to green (motor). ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; pMCC, posterior mid-cingulate cortex; SMA, supplementary 
motor area; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; vS, ventral striatum; vTA, ventral tegmental area.
including vigour of response, towards goals11 21 23 (s3). Finally, 
the production of behaviour is mediated by the motor system, 
including posterior mid-cingulate cortex, supplementary 
motor area and dorsal striatum, under the influence of these 
inputs (figure 1C). We emphasise that, although conceptually 
useful for understanding the different components contrib-
uting to normal motivated behaviour, it is unlikely that the 
proposed valuation, mediating and motor systems exist as 
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discrete entities within the brain. Rather, these processes are 
likely to be instantiated neurally along anatomical and func-
tional gradients (s4) (figure 1—background colour scheme).
dImensIons of moTIvATed behAvIour
Over the past few decades, research in artificial intelligence has 
yielded several computational algorithms that realise these prin-
ciples in different ways (s5). Drawing on these insights, parallel 
work in cognitive neuroscience has suggested that these processes 
express in living agents along two key dimensions of neurocog-
nitive function (figure 1). First, the brain appears to distinguish 
between inflexible, habitual (so-called model-free) behaviours, 
which according to some accounts are processed mainly by the 
striatum; and flexible, goal-directed (so-called model-based) 
behaviours, which are processed mainly by the frontal cortex 
(vertical dimension in figure 1).24 Second, motor control func-
tions appear to be represented hierarchically along the medial 
frontal cortex, with more rostral areas responsible for the most 
complex aspects of motivated behaviour (horizontal dimension 
in figure 1C).25
Early studies of habitual behaviour focused on the motor 
functions of the basal ganglia, especially within the dorsal stri-
atum (figure 1C, bottom half), where DA reward prediction 
error signals were hypothesised to reinforce rewarding actions.15 
Comparable with the imprinting of reward predictions instanti-
ated within the VS (figure 1A), this process is thought to solidify 
actions into habits that are easy to execute but inflexible and 
difficult to overcome. In contrast, a goal-directed system asso-
ciated with the prefrontal cortex is thought to use an internal 
model of the environment (encompassing the current (subjec-
tive) value of potential reinforcers and the effort costs required 
to obtain them) to flexibly adapt behaviour (figure 1C, top half).
This flexibility is considered to be especially useful when plan-
ning sequences of goal-directed actions.24 But its power comes at 
a cost: goal-directed actions demand greater brain resources than 
do habitual actions (s6). Together, this dual-systems mechanism 
allows a goal-directed approach to novel problems (like figuring 
out what to eat when starting a new diet), with control subse-
quently moving to the habitual system once the problem has 
been overlearnt (like automatically reaching for a healthy snack 
after the diet has been internalised), thereby freeing resources 
within the prefrontal cortex to be directed to the next problem.
Yet despite their complementary strengths, as described so 
far, both goal-directed and habitual systems would struggle with 
real-world problems that demand extended chains of actions. 
For example, a holiday to a foreign country might stymie both 
the habitual system (because every action on the trip would 
require repeated reinforcement, which is an unlikely prospect 
even for consummate globetrotters) and the goal-directed system 
(because, due to capacity limits, planning would be overwhelmed 
by a combinatorial explosion of potential action sequences).
This computational challenge has led to a possible solution: 
that individuals reframe complex action sequences hierarchically. 
Rather than making a series of choices between low-level actions 
(like turning on the computer, opening a browser, searching for 
a travel website and so on), the system instead selects between 
relatively abstract, high-level actions (like buying a ticket, taking 
a taxi to the airport, going to the gate and so on). Then, once a 
high-level action has been selected and put into execution, the 
details of the action fall to lower level systems for implemen-
tation. It has recently been proposed the rostral-caudal extent 
of the medial frontal cortex contributes to such hierarchical 
encoding23 25 (horizontal axis of figure 1C).
At the apex of both goal-directed and hierarchical systems 
lies the ACC.23 26 27 This conjunction of hierarchically organ-
ised action selection with model-based planning enables the 
development and execution of plans that lower level systems 
might have trouble implementing. Imagine planning a trip to a 
foreign country to celebrate an important anniversary only to 
find that your ride to the airport has been delayed, necessitating 
a luggage-encumbered sprint to the gate. Success might require 
that the higher level system enforce its plan, especially should the 
lower level systems—which are oblivious to the personal impor-
tance of the trip for you—baulk at its demands. Thus, it has 
been proposed that a critical feature of ACC function may be to 
marshal the effort necessary to execute hierarchically organised, 
goal-directed behaviours.23 26 This process is likely supported by 
DA signals and reciprocal connections with the VS and vmPFC 
that enable learning about both the subjective value as well as 
the effort costs of actions.12 23 As we discuss below, weighing up 
the subjective value of a potential course of action against the 
effort required is an important theoretical framework for under-
standing motivation and apathy.
defICITs In behAvIourAl ACTIvATIon In AnImAls
Because motivationally relevant stimuli are typically at some 
psychological or physical distance away from organisms, moti-
vated behaviour takes place in phases.28 While the direct inter-
action with a motivational stimulus is typically referred to as the 
consummatory phase (also known as ‘taking’), the behaviours that 
must be engaged in to gain access to the motivational stimulus 
are generally referred to as instrumental in nature (or ‘seeking’) 
(figure 2A). Central to the construct of motivation is that instru-
mental behaviours have clear directional aspects, being driven 
towards or away from particular stimuli or conditions—that is, 
they are ‘goal directed’. However, another fundamental feature 
of motivation is its activational aspects. Motivated behaviour 
is often characterised by high levels of activity, vigour and/or 
persistence,11 28 factors that are often considered as part of an 
‘energizing’ component of motivation.29
These activational or energising aspects of motivation can 
be highly adaptive because they enable organisms to overcome 
obstacles that separate them from conditions that are critical for 
survival. Thus, in terms that make reference to concepts in the 
field of behavioural economics, organisms must pay the work-re-
lated response costs that allow access to motivationally relevant 
goals. This can be seen in animals foraging in the wild, as well as 
animals running in mazes or pressing levers in laboratory exper-
iments. Moreover, these features of motivation are evident in 
humans striving vigorously for a career or life goal. Over the 
last few decades, animal research has greatly expanded our 
understanding of the role played by the mesolimbic DA system, 
along with the neural regions including the VS and the ACC, in 
effort-related aspects of motivation, including the exertion of 
effort during the performance of instrumental behaviour tasks, 
and effort-based decision making (EBDM).11 28
Animal studies of ebdm
Studies of effort-based decision making traditionally offer organ-
isms a choice between access to a preferred reinforcer that can 
be obtained only via a high-effort instrumental action versus a 
less preferred but low-effort option (see ref 11 for review). One 
commonly used procedure involves giving an animal a choice 
between operant lever pressing to receive a preferred reinforcer 
(eg, high-carbohydrate pellets) versus approach and consump-
tion of a less preferred reinforcer (eg, standard lab chow) that is 
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figure 2 effects of dopaminergic and anatomical lesions on phases of motivated behaviour. (A) Motivated behaviour takes place in two distinct phases. 
The consummatory phase involves direct interaction with the motivational stimulus, whereas the instrumental phase describes the behaviours required 
to obtain this stimulus. instrumental behaviours are both directional (towards or away from stimuli) and activational (energising), allowing organisms to 
overcome obstacles separating them from salient stimuli. Thus, organisms pay response ‘costs’ to access motivationally relevant goals. (B) effort-based choice 
is often assessed in rodents using one of two experimental set-ups. Animals can be free to choose between pressing a lever (effort cost) a fixed number 
of times (ratio can be varied) to receive a preferred reinforcer, or accessing standard lab chow (less preferred reinforcer) at any point. (C) Alternatively a 
T-maze set-up allows animals to choose between a high-reward, high-effort cost option and a low-reward, lower cost option. (D) Both low-dose systemic 
dopamine antagonists and local (nucleus accumbens) dopamine depletion or antagonism bias responses towards low-effort, low-reward options, without 
affecting reward preference (when effort costs are equalised) or motor ability. Thus interference with the dopaminergic system reduces animals’ willingness 
to undertake costs to access motivationally relevant goals. (e) Anterior cingulate cortex lesions produce very similar changes in behaviour. Prior to the lesion, 
rodents preferred to climb a 30 cm barrier to obtain high rewards (A and B on graph). Post lesion, the behaviour changed dramatically, with rodents now 
choosing the low-effort, low-reward option (C). However, equalising effort costs led to rodents again choosing the high-reward option (D), indicating reward 
preference was not altered by the lesion. Adapted from Aberman and Salamone, 1999 (s33); walton et al10 with permission. DA, dopamine; HR, high reward 
(arm)
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freely available in the chamber (s7) (figure 2B). Typically a fixed 
ratio (eg, five presses) or a progressive ratio (increasing number 
of presses each trial) paradigm is used. Alternatively, in T-maze 
effort-based choice procedures, one arm of the maze contains 
a higher density of food reward that can be obtained only by 
climbing a barrier, whereas the alternative choice is to access an 
arm that contains less food, but has no or a lower barrier10 30 
(figure 2C).
The preponderance of research on such effort-based choice has 
focused on the role of DA systems. DA antagonists with varying 
degrees of D1 or D2 family selectivity, whether administered 
systemically or directly into the NAc, consistently produce shifts 
in choice behaviour marked by decreased selection of the high-ef-
fort option and a bias towards selecting the low-effort option28 
(figure 2D). This low-effort bias is also induced by neurotoxic or 
pharmacological depletion of NAc DA.19 In contrast, medial stri-
atal DA antagonism or depletion generally fails to induce alter-
ations in effort-based choice,19 and lateral striatal DA depletions 
produce severe motor coordination impairments that non-spe-
cifically affect performance (s8). Therefore, changes in effort-
based choice associated with DA manipulations are specific to 
NAc manipulations.
Importantly, a number of control experiments have clearly 
demonstrated that these effects cannot be explained by other 
factors. In particular, a strong literature demonstrates that DA 
depletion does not alter reinforcer preference when effort costs 
to obtain the reward are equalised, meaning there is no evidence 
that the effects of impaired DA transmission on effort-based 
choice are mediated by some kind of ‘reward’ or ‘liking’ impair-
ment.19 31 Similarly, these effects cannot be attributed to deficits 
in motor incapacity. For example, in studies using the T-maze 
barrier task, it has been shown that DA depletions that induce a 
low-effort bias do not impair the ability of animals to climb the 
barrier if that is the only way to obtain the food (s9).
In summary, low doses of DA antagonists or NAc DA antag-
onism or depletion affects behavioural activation functions that 
represent areas of functional overlap between motivational and 
motor function, crucially without producing broad deficits in 
either reward preference (when effort costs are equal) or motor 
incapacity. In terms of behavioural economics concepts, inter-
ference with DA transmission effectively dissociates ‘willingness 
to pay’ from preference or utility, which could reflect a reduced 
perception of behavioural resources available for paying effort-
based costs.11 That is, DA depletion reduces willingness to under-
take effort costs in order to access motivationally relevant goals.
Of course, no one transmitter or brain area mediates a 
behavioural function in isolation. Mesolimbic DA is part of 
a distributed forebrain circuitry that includes the basolateral 
amygdala, prefrontal/anterior cingulate cortex and ventral 
pallidum, and anatomical lesions of these sites produce strik-
ingly similar changes in choice preference (towards low-effort, 
low-reward options) as DA manipulations10 32 (s10) (figure 2E). 
Furthermore, a number of transmitters and neuromodulators 
in addition to DA participate in the regulation of effort-re-
lated choice, including acetylcholine, adenosine, serotonin and 
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA).19 20 The distributed nature 
of this circuitry offers challenges to researchers attempting to 
establish the contributions of each component, but also offers 
opportunities for exploring potential pharmacological strate-
gies that can be developed for clinical intervention (see online 
supplementary material—Animal models of motivational 
dysfunction).
APAThy In The ConTexT of moTIvATed behAvIour
The body of work reviewed above, spanning basic neurosci-
ence research in animal models to computational and imaging 
methods in healthy humans, emphasises a distributed but inter-
connected network of brain regions operating to produce moti-
vated behaviour, under the influence of neuromodulators such 
as DA. Furthermore, structural or pharmacological disruption 
of this network in animal models reduces the effort that animals 
are prepared to exert to obtain rewards, their willingness to 
engage with goal-directed activities, their persistence and vigour 
of actions towards these goals, and their ability to learn from 
outcomes.11 Although caution should always be exercised in 
extrapolating the results of animal studies to human behaviour, 
these features have a striking similarity to aspects of the clin-
ical syndrome of apathy. Moreover, the very regions identified 
in studies of normal motivated behaviour—in particular ACC 
and VS—have been implicated in clinical apathy across several 
different disorders and imaging modalities7 (figure 3B).
ebdm in apathy
As discussed above, the cognitive processes involved in the 
activation and maintenance of behaviour—or sequences of 
behaviours—towards goals are often described as elements of 
EBDM. They include choosing whether to perform actions 
towards a goal, sustaining behaviour with reference to back-
ground reward context and learning through monitoring 
outcomes of a behaviour. In other words: Is it worth it, is it still 
worth it and was it worth it? EBDM thus provides a neurobio-
logically grounded framework within which to investigate the 
cognitive mechanisms that may underlie apathy, a framework on 
which empirical studies are beginning to build (figure 3).
Integration of rewards and effort costs to drive goal-directed 
behaviour
As noted previously, the process of integrating reward (reinforcer) 
and effort information to drive behaviour may occur simultane-
ously at multiple hierarchical levels (individual action, subgoal, 
goal) and is strongly influenced by the mesolimbic dopaminergic 
system. An important question is whether apathetic patients fail 
to undertake goal-directed activities because they are insensitive 
to the rewards associated with the activity, or whether they are 
instead hypersensitive to effort costs. Either change could reduce 
an integrated value signal, making activation of behaviour 
towards a goal less likely to occur.
There is emerging physiological evidence that reward 
processing is altered in apathetic patients, such that they are insen-
sitive to rewarding outcomes.33 34 Pupillary dilatation to incen-
tives provides an autonomic marker of motivation (s11). Blunting 
of this normal pupillary response has now been demonstrated in 
two separate, clinically apathetic patient groups—PD and cere-
bral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical infarcts 
and leucoencephalopathy (CADASIL)—as they performed a 
saccadic eye movement task for rewards34 35 (figure 3C). Simi-
larly, reduced activation of neural regions including the VS and 
OFC in response to reward information during functional MRI 
(fMRI) studies has been associated with amotivation in patients 
with schizophrenia.36 37
These physiological alterations in reward processing are 
mirrored by behavioural changes. In separate studies in which 
patients decided whether or not to exert physical effort for 
rewards, both apathetic patients with PD and CADASIL were 
less willing to accept offers. Crucially, this change in response 
was not global across the sampled options, but instead was driven 
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figure 3 A neurocognitive framework for apathy. (A) Apathy could result from alterations in the processes underlying the translation of value information 
to actions, which are often described under the term effort-based decision making. Reduced willingness to exert effort for reward (effort-based choice—’is it 
worth it’), as well as impaired persistence and vigour towards goals (‘is it still worth it’), could lead to the reduced goal-directed behaviour that characterises 
apathy. Similarly changes in learning from the reinforcing outcomes of actions could change the likelihood of the same behaviour being repeated in the 
future (’was it worth it’). These changes could be driven by anatomical disruption of key neural regions (such as the anterior cingulate cortex and ventral 
striatum) and/or changes in neuromodulators such as the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. (B) A large number of studies, across disorders and using 
different imaging modalities (eg, positron emission tomography), have associated disruption of the ventral striatum and anterior cingulate with apathy. (C) 
Reward sensitivity can be assessed by measuring the degree of pupillary dilatation to reinforcer information. Apathy is associated with impaired autonomic 
(pupillary) responses to reward in both genetic cerebral small vessel disease (shown) and PD. (D) effort-based choice can be assessed by sequentially offering 
patients varying levels of reward in return for exerting varying levels of effort. Apathy is associated with reduced willingness to exert effort for reward. This 
change is not global, but is driven by reduced sensitivity to rewarding outcomes without a change in sensitivity to effort costs, in both patients with genetic 
small vessel disease and PD (shown). (e) Gambling tasks, in which patients select an option and are then provided feedback about whether they ‘won’ or 
‘lost’, allow assessment of outcome-related physiological changes, which are thought to drive learning. PD patients with apathy show blunted outcome-
related electrophysiological activity compared with non-apathetic patients. Adapted from Le Heron et al 201835 38 , Martínez-Horta et al,33 Robert et al 
201434 and Schroeter et al 201335 with permission. CADASiL, cerebral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical infarcts and leucoencephalopathy; 
MvC, maximal voluntary contraction; PD, Parkinson’s disease.
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by reduced sensitivity to rewards, but not increased sensitivity to 
effort costs. In other words, apathetic patients were prepared to 
exert even high levels of effort, but only if rewards were high 
enough35 38 (figure 3D). Furthermore, this reduction in reward 
incentivisation was associated with greater blunting of pupillary 
responses to reward, linking physiological evidence of reduced 
reward sensitivity in apathy to a behavioural consequence.
Changes i35 n effort-based choice associated with apathy have 
also been demonstrated in patients with schizophrenia,37 39 and 
related to levels of motivation and DA state in non-apathetic 
patients with PD.40 These results are complemented by an fMRI 
study in which changes in the blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) signal were measured as healthy participants performed 
a similar decision-making task. Higher levels of apathy traits in 
this group were associated with individual differences within 
the ACC and related medial frontal regions considered to be 
crucial for marshalling the effort to execute such goal-directed 
behaviours23 41 (figure 1).
Intriguingly, in PD the effect of apathy on choice was disso-
ciable from the effect of DA depletion (via an overnight with-
drawal of patients’ normal dopaminergic medications). In 
contrast to apathy’s effect on low-reward options, depleting DA 
reduced acceptance of options which required high effort for 
high rewards,38 consistent with animal models of DA depletion.11 
Together, this work suggests that measures to increase the incen-
tivising value of rewards are an important therapeutic target, but 
simply increasing dopaminergic tone—while increasing activa-
tion towards high reward options—may not specifically alter the 
underlying apathetic state.38
Persistence
Persisting with an action-set towards a temporally or spatially 
remote reward is a crucial aspect of instrumental behaviour.28 
Furthermore, like other components of instrumental behaviour 
such as the vigour of response, persistence is strongly influenced 
by the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, and particularly its 
projections to VS and ACC.9 28 As discussed in earlier sections, 
the concept of persistence applies to a single behaviour towards 
a goal, but crucially also to the extended sequences of behaviours 
required to attain most rewarding outcomes relevant to humans. 
The ACC in particular has been implicated in maintaining these 
behaviours over extended time periods.26 Given the clear asso-
ciation between ACC disruption and apathy, and the association 
of altered mesolimbic dopaminergic systems with apathy in PD, 
failure of persistence towards a goal is another possible compo-
nent that could contribute to the apathetic phenotype, and 
which future research could gainfully explore (s12).
However, it is not enough to blindly persist towards an earlier 
selected goal. Adaptive behaviour requires online monitoring of 
the chosen option against other possibilities—a process captured 
by foreground/background decision making and foraging models 
of behaviour.42 In these models, the crucial question is whether 
the value of the current behaviour (What am I doing right now?) 
is higher than the background average value of behaviours in 
the current environment (What else could I be doing?) (s13). An 
important question for future study is whether this class of deci-
sions is altered in apathetic patients, and in particular whether 
the reward insensitivity observed in apathetic patients might 
lead to a chronic underestimation of the environmental reward 
context (What else could I be doing?), such that it is never worth 
switching activities (even if the current activity is simply sitting 
on the couch). Interestingly, such an alteration of behaviour has 
been reported in patients with schizophrenia, associated with 
their degree of anhedonia which, on the questionnaire used, 
likely reflected deficits in reward-seeking behaviour.43
Vigour
The vigour of response is another key component of instrumental 
behaviour.28 Importantly, motor responses towards rewarding 
targets were preserved in apathetic patients with PD in two sepa-
rate studies, despite altered sensitivity to the rewarding outcome 
itself.34 38 These findings contrast with another investigation, 
which reported a reduction in motor vigour associated with 
apathy.44 Further studies specifically examining this issue will be 
important.
Learning
ACC and VS activity encodes information about the outcomes 
of our actions, and these signals can drive learning about which 
behaviours are worth performing in the future.22 45 How could 
this be relevant to apathy? Apathetic behaviour might potentially 
arise from systematic biases in learning about actions and their 
outcomes. A down-weighting of learning about how actions 
relate to rewarding outcomes could lead to reward insensitivity, 
while increased weighting between a course of action and its 
effort costs might result in hypersensitivity to these costs during 
subsequent decisions. Any change in the balance between these 
two learning processes could alter the weighing up of costs 
and rewards as an individual decides if an action is worth it 
(figure 3A). Notably, one group has reported such a change in 
outcome-related electrophysiological activity (associated with 
reward information) in apathetic patients with PD33 (figure 3E). 
Furthermore, a number of behavioural and imaging studies have 
demonstrated an association between impaired learning about 
rewards and amotivation in schizophrenia.37 These changes 
could conceivably result, over time, in the pattern of deci-
sion-making behaviour recently observed in apathetic patients 
with PD, in which a higher threshold of reward was required to 
trigger acceptance of effortful offers.38
other potential contributors to amotivated behaviour
There are also other cognitive processes relevant to goal-di-
rected behaviour and thus potentially apathy. Furthermore, it 
is notable that changes in EBDM associated with apathy have 
tended to correlate with particular apathy domains—subscales 
that emphasise a person’s daily activities and ability to initiate 
these activities.34 38 The lack of correlation between these task 
metrics and other subscales (eg, those mapping onto cognitive or 
emotional dimensions of apathy) suggests there are other facets 
of what we currently conceptualise as apathy that may not be 
explained by deficits in EBDM alone. Nevertheless, the role in 
particular of emotional blunting in apathy, and how this relates 
to aspects of goal-directed behaviour such as reward valuation, 
is an important topic for further research. A recent synthesis 
of decision making and emotions proposed that emotions are 
simply states elicited by rewards and punishers, as the result of 
actions, and it is these states themselves that may form the goals 
of actions.46 This suggests that overlapping neural processes may 
underlie reward valuation and emotions, processes which depend 
crucially on structures within the medial frontal cortex.14 46 We 
next consider other phases of behaviour that may be relevant to 
the apathetic syndrome.
Option generation
The process of generating potential options for behaviour 
provides crucial inputs for subsequent decision making and 
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has been linked to function within the anterolateral prefrontal 
cortex.47 Recent work has found that apathetic traits in healthy 
participants are associated with reduced option generation, 
although this same result was not seen in clinically apathetic 
patients with PD.48
Enacting behaviour towards goals
The ability to coordinate thoughts and actions in relation to 
internal goals is a multifaceted construct often subsumed within 
the term cognitive control.49 Key components include working 
memory, cognitive flexibility, inhibition and planning, often 
referred to collectively as executive functions. Most conceptu-
alisations of apathy include a specific ‘cognitive’ component 
referring to dysfunction of the above processes, putatively asso-
ciated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)-dorsal stri-
atum loop damage.2 50 There is also some neuroimaging evidence 
associating DLPFC and apathy.51 It could be argued that such 
cognitive deficits reduce goal-directed behaviour in a way more 
akin to physical impairments preventing movements rather than 
being a primary deficit in motivation. This is because it is the 
inability to enact behaviour towards a goal rather than reduced 
drive towards the goal which is altered. Although there is some 
evidence for executive dysfunction associated with apathy, it is 
inconsistent between studies and patient groups52 (s14). This 
could relate to variation in the apathy syndrome, tasks lacking 
the fine-grained assessment required to detect more subtle 
changes, or confounding factors such as concurrent damage to 
other brain regions important for motivated behaviour. Further 
research is required to determine the specific impact of dysfunc-
tion of executive processes on motivated behaviour.
A role for bad habits?
That apathy is a disorder of goal-directed behaviour is essen-
tially sine qua non.2 53 However, there is no empirical evidence 
to suggest other systems of behaviour are preserved in apathy, in 
particular habitual behaviour (figure 1). Many of the behaviours 
that apathetic patients do not do, such as cleaning the house or 
making a cup of tea, are probably normally performed under 
the guidance of habitual systems.54 Future research might inves-
tigate the formation and maintenance of habitual behaviour in 
apathetic patients. Demonstration of impairment within this 
system would have implications for both non-pharmacological 
(eg, overtraining patients on basic activities) and pharmacolog-
ical treatments.
Environmental context
While the discussion thus far has focused on how disruption 
of normal cognitive processes could lead to apathy, it is also 
important to consider the context within which behaviour 
occurs. Simplistically, a person’s environment consists of rein-
forcers (both positive and negative) which can vary in terms 
of both quantity and predictability (s15). Positive reinforcers 
can be complex phenomenon such as conversing with a friend, 
being smiled at, successfully baking a cake, hearing a song on 
a radio and so on. A context in which there are few positive 
reinforcers, or in which it is difficult to learn the relationship 
between actions and positive outcomes, could also lead to, or 
exacerbate, apathetic behaviour. This is a particularly important 
point to consider because the diseases in which apathy occurs 
(table 1) also tend to predispose patients to be in such poorly 
reinforcing environments.
Apathy and neuromodulatory systems—dA and beyond
There is a clear scientific basis for considering the mesolimbic 
dopaminergic system as a primary influence of and poten-
tial therapeutic target for apathy.9 28 55 However there is now 
evidence that DA exerts at least some of its actions on motivated 
behaviour along a dissociable axis to apathy.38 Furthermore, 
although some therapeutic trials have demonstrated improve-
ment in apathy with dopaminergic manipulations,56 57 others 
have not.58
The neuroscience literature has begun to emphasise the 
importance of non-dopaminergic systems in aspects of moti-
vated behaviour and EBDM.11 20 Preliminary clinical data have 
demonstrated the efficacy of agomelatine, a 5-HT2C receptor 
inverse agonist, in treating apathy in patients with frontotem-
poral dementia,59 while manipulations of the cholinergic system 
have also shown promise in PD.60 Interestingly, the effects of 
these neuromodulators on EBDM are still tied to the meso-
limbic dopaminergic system.19 This illustrates the complexity 
inherent in understanding the role of specific neurotransmitters 
in goal-directed behaviour, particularly in the setting of neuro-
degenerative disorders that are characterised by loss of multiple 
neuromodulatory pathways. Nevertheless, as our understanding 
of these systems grows, the opportunity to tailor pharmacolog-
ical therapies more closely to their desired therapeutic effect 
should arise.
ConCludIng remArKs
Conceptualising apathy in terms of our knowledge of the under-
lying basic neuroscience of motivated behaviour results in a 
framework that, to some extent, challenges the current nosolog-
ical approach to apathy. The conceptual approach to apathy we 
suggest here is in line with a broader shift to understand neuro-
psychiatric syndromes in terms of underlying normal neurobi-
ology. However, this approach remains limited by, on one side, 
an evolving (rather than settled) understanding of how motivated 
behaviour is produced, and on the other side only scanty empir-
ical evidence for what cognitive processes are actually disrupted 
in patients with apathy. As we outline above, further research is 
required—at behavioural and physiological levels—to delineate 
the components of goal-directed behaviour that are impaired in 
apathy, whether these changes are general or disease-specific, 
and how they relate to changes in neuromodulatory systems. 
This research should ultimately aim, through a deeper under-
standing of the mechanisms disrupting motivated behaviour, to 
develop effective treatments for this debilitating syndrome.
Additional references can be found in the online supplemen-
tary material.
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Animal models of motivational dysfunction 
 
Recent research has focused upon the development of formal animal models of effort-related 
motivational dysfunction, which could contribute to the development of treatments for 
apathy, anergia, and fatigue symptoms seen across multiple disorders. Much recent research 
has focused on the use of tetrabenazine (TBZ) for inducing impairments in effort-related 
decision making (1). TBZ reversibly inhibits the type-2 vesicular monoamine transporter, 
which blocks vesicular storage and results in a depletion of monoamines, with particularly 
strong effects on DA at low doses. Recent studies have shown that the effort-related 
impairments induced by TBZ across multiple tasks can be reversed by adenosine A2A 
antagonists (1,2) and also by DAT inhibitors (1,2) but not by drugs that block SERT or NET 
(3). Similar results have been observed in studies inducing effort-related dysfunction by 
administering pro-inflammatory cytokines (4).  
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